NHTSA owner reports · September 18, 2026 snapshot.
What owners actually said
385 reports126,000 miles · Jul 24, 2026
Electrical System
The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while driving at an undisclosed speed, the front windshield wipers inadvertently activated. The contact turned the windshield wipers on and off to deactivate the windshield wipers. Additionally, the headlights inadvertently illuminated, and the doors locked and unlock…
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The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while driving at an undisclosed speed, the front windshield wipers inadvertently activated. The contact turned the windshield wipers on and off to deactivate the windshield wipers. Additionally, the headlights inadvertently illuminated, and the doors locked and unlocked independently while the vehicle was unoccupied, parked, and turned off in the driveway. The vehicle occasionally hesitated while starting. The contact stated that the failure had caused the battery to drain. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired by an independent mechanic or dealer. The contact associated the failure to NHTSA Campaign Number: 14V530000 (Electrical System); however, the VIN was not included in the recall. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 126,000.
NHTSA ODI #11752635
Mileage unknown · Dec 10, 2025
Unknown Or Other
Skyroof suddenly stopped working and will not close. No dealers will fix as thry say parts aren't longer available..my car is now worthless and is a safety issue while driving with the roof partially opened.
NHTSA ODI #11704187
Mileage unknown · Dec 9, 2025
Air BagsSuspensionWheelsCrashInjury
My daughter was hit by a semi truck on US-23 today. The trailer fishtailed hit the back end of Jeep. I hit the guard rail. All four corners of the Jeep were hit. The air bags did not deploy. The front driver tire fell off. The back window and passenger side trunk window blew out.
NHTSA ODI #11703957
29,000 miles · Jul 15, 2025
Engine And Engine Cooling
The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while making a right turn on a main road at 25 MPH, the front lower control arms snapped. There was no warning light illuminated. The contact immediately pulled over onto the side of the road and had the vehicle towed to the residence. The local dealer was contacted; …
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The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while making a right turn on a main road at 25 MPH, the front lower control arms snapped. There was no warning light illuminated. The contact immediately pulled over onto the side of the road and had the vehicle towed to the residence. The local dealer was contacted; however, the vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The contact was informed that the VIN was not under recall. The manufacturer was notified of the failure. The approximate failure mileage was 29,000.
NHTSA ODI #11673807
171,000 miles · May 14, 2025
Electrical System
Odometer Fraud. The contact purchased a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while attempting to register the vehicle, it was discovered that there was a mileage discrepancy. The vehicle was a private sale. At the time of purchase, the vehicle mileage was 94,000 and at the time of registration, it was discovered that the m…
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Odometer Fraud. The contact purchased a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while attempting to register the vehicle, it was discovered that there was a mileage discrepancy. The vehicle was a private sale. At the time of purchase, the vehicle mileage was 94,000 and at the time of registration, it was discovered that the mileage was 171,000.
NHTSA ODI #11660979
86,000 miles · Jan 31, 2025
Air BagsSeats
The contact's sister owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that upon opening the door of the vehicle, the contact's sister became aware that the driver's side headrest had been deployed. The dealer was notified of the failure and informed the contact that the vehicle was previously repaired under NHTSA Campaign Number: 17…
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The contact's sister owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that upon opening the door of the vehicle, the contact's sister became aware that the driver's side headrest had been deployed. The dealer was notified of the failure and informed the contact that the vehicle was previously repaired under NHTSA Campaign Number: 17V640000 (Seats, Air Bags). The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure and referred the contact to the dealer for diagnostic testing. A case was opened. The failure mileage was approximately 86,000.
NHTSA ODI #11639908
Mileage unknown · Oct 22, 2024
Power Train
The vehicle gears slipped into neutral but back to drive without assistance on my part. Once at a stop sign when I resumed driving. Once turning a corner. Once getting ready to back up. / I took it to have the transmission fluid level checked and it checked out ok. There have been no transmission recalls reported on the 2012 Jee…
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The vehicle gears slipped into neutral but back to drive without assistance on my part. Once at a stop sign when I resumed driving. Once turning a corner. Once getting ready to back up. / I took it to have the transmission fluid level checked and it checked out ok. There have been no transmission recalls reported on the 2012 Jeep Liberty. The pan and filter had had a leak and was replaced a couple of weeks before this slippage happened
NHTSA ODI #11621238
95,000 miles · Sep 30, 2024
Power TrainSuspension
The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while driving approximately 65 MPH, the contact became aware of an abnormal wobbling coming from the front end of the vehicle. Additionally, there were several unknown warning lights illuminated. The contact drove the vehicle to the local tire shop where the four tire…
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The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated that while driving approximately 65 MPH, the contact became aware of an abnormal wobbling coming from the front end of the vehicle. Additionally, there were several unknown warning lights illuminated. The contact drove the vehicle to the local tire shop where the four tires were replaced and an alignment was performed; however, the failure persisted. The contact stated that several days later while driving at an undisclosed speed, the gear shifter seized, and the vehicle turned off unintendedly. The contact pulled over to the side of the road, parked, and inspected the vehicle. The contact called a local mechanic who drove to the scene to diagnose the vehicle. The contact was informed that the VCM software needed to be updated. The vehicle was not repaired. The manufacturer was not notified. The approximate failure mileage was 95,000.
NHTSA ODI #11617342
Mileage unknown · Sep 9, 2024
Electrical SystemExterior Lighting
Electrical issue with drivers side front blinker works when headlights are off but when headlights are turned on front blinker does not work. I’ve seen numerous complaints about the same issue with this vehicle amongst other electrical issues
NHTSA ODI #11613483
140,000 miles · May 15, 2024
Suspension
The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated while driving 40 MPH, there was a loud banging sound coming from the suspension on the driver’s side rear of the vehicle. The contact became aware that the rear end of the vehicle was loose and was falling apart onto the roadway. The contact pulled to the side of the road.…
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The contact owns a 2012 Jeep Liberty. The contact stated while driving 40 MPH, there was a loud banging sound coming from the suspension on the driver’s side rear of the vehicle. The contact became aware that the rear end of the vehicle was loose and was falling apart onto the roadway. The contact pulled to the side of the road. There was no warning light illuminated. The vehicle was towed to the residence. The dealer was not contacted, and the vehicle was not repaired. The manufacturer was not notified of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 140,000.
NHTSA ODI #11588960
NHTSA investigations
6EA21002 · Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
Opened Sep 17, 2021 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module; Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Air Bags:frontal:driver Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
Air Bags:frontal:passenger Side:inflator Module
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
PE19014 · Active Head Rest Inadvertent Deployment
Opened Sep 9, 2019 · Closed Feb 25, 2026
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Seats; Seats:front Assembly:head Restraint
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE19014 on September 9, 2019, to investigate 128 consumer complaints alleging that the Active Head Rest (AHR) inadvertently deployed without the occurrence of a crash or other rear impact event in model year (MY) 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles.When ODI opened the investigation, ODI was aware of thirteen alleged injuries.A small number of Early Warning Reports identified driver and/or passenger front seat AHR inadvertent deployments without a rear impact event.Reported safety consequences resulting from the AHR deployments include concussions, headaches, soft tissue injuries, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and/or loss of vehicle control as a result of being surprised and distracted by being struck in the head by the inadvertent AHR deployment. On September 24, 2019, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA).ODI requested certain detailed information from FCA related to the following subject vehicles: MY 2010-2014 Dodge Avenger 200, MY 2010-2014 Dodge Calber, MY 2010-2014 Chrysler Sebring, MY 2013-2015 Ram Tradesman, MY 2012 Ram Van, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Grand Caravan, MY 2010-2016 Chrysler Town and Country, MY 2010-2017 Jeep Compass, MY 2011-2020 Dodge Durango, MY 2011-2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Journey, MY 2010-2012 Jeep Liberty, MY 2010-2011 Jeep Nitro, and MY 2010-2011 Jeep Patriot vehicles.On December 2, 2019, ODI received a response from FCA that included vehicle production data, consumer complaints, field reports, warranty claims, manufacturer actions, production changes, and other data related to the alleged defect from the start of production (2010) through September 24, 2019.On January 27, 2020, ODI received an update to the December 2, 2019, IR response from FCA.On September 22, 2020, ODI requested additional subject vehicle AHR information from FCA.ODI received FCA's response on October 21, 2020.ODI subsequently received an update to FCA's October 21, 2020, response on February 16, 2021.During the investigation, ODI requested updates to certain IR questions on two occasions.FCA provided updates to question #2 on March 5, 2021, and questions #2 and #5 on May 26, 2023. FCA’s IR response data identified approximately 7.5 million subject vehicles (with approximately 15 million AHR assemblies).Due to the large number of vehicles and failure reports, ODI focused its analysis on the FCA vehicle model with the highest failure rate to represent the worst-case scenario.For this purpose, ODI focused on MY 2012-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles for its analysis.This population includes 710,890 vehicles that FCA manufactured between August 19, 2011, and August 8, 2015.ODI identified 2,839 alleged AHR failures within this limited population.ODI identified 263 alleged injuries that were caused by AHR failures in MY 2012-2015 Grand Cherokees vehicles.Of these alleged injuries, ODI categorized them as eighty-two (82) soft tissue (neck/whiplash, bruise) injuries, four (4) concussions, fifty-nine (59) headaches, and one hundred eighteen (118) without a specific injury description.Although complainants have alleged injuries, ODI has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate or validate any injuries where medical treatment was required.Consumer outreach was conducted by ODI, where sixty-three (63) FCA complainants with alleged injuries were contacted.Twelve of the sixty-three FCA consumers responded and were interviewed by ODI.ODI requested medical records, however, only one response was provided. Attorneys representing the responding complainant provided a synopsis that indicated they had experienced prior neck-related injuries dating to the mid-1990s.ODI also contacted one hundred (100) consumers who submitted Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) in an attempt to validate alleged injuries. Despite the efforts of ODI, the office has been unsuccessful at obtaining substantive documentation/evidence supporting complaints that allege serious injuries (where pre-existing medical conditions did not already exist). In addition to the low severity of alleged injuries caused by AHR deployments, there have been eleven alleged crashes and two alleged lane departures within the entire subject vehicle population that has been in the field up to sixteen years (with over 8,500 AHR inadvertent deployments).ODI was not able to validate that the alleged crashes were the result of inadvertent head rest deployments, and the crashes were minor in nature. ODI has conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged safety defect and with up to sixteen years of exposure for some vehicles and over 8,500 inadvertent AHR deployments, no serious crashes or injuries could be validated in the sub-population of focus.The lack of serious injuries validated by ODI with such large period of field exposure is consistent with thework done by NHTSA’s Human Injury Research Division and the Biodynamic Research Corporation, which support that an inadvertent AHR deployment is not likely to cause serious injury.In addition to the low risk of injury, FCA released an extended warranty program that covers inadvertent AHR deployment for ten years / unlimited mileage from the vehicle's in-service date. PE19014 is closed with the FCA extended warranty program.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances. To review a complete closing summary, please the attached closing report. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Additional source detail variants (2)
Seats
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE19014 on September 9, 2019, to investigate 128 consumer complaints alleging that the Active Head Rest (AHR) inadvertently deployed without the occurrence of a crash or other rear impact event in model year (MY) 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles.When ODI opened the investigation, ODI was aware of thirteen alleged injuries.A small number of Early Warning Reports identified driver and/or passenger front seat AHR inadvertent deployments without a rear impact event.Reported safety consequences resulting from the AHR deployments include concussions, headaches, soft tissue injuries, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and/or loss of vehicle control as a result of being surprised and distracted by being struck in the head by the inadvertent AHR deployment. On September 24, 2019, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA).ODI requested certain detailed information from FCA related to the following subject vehicles: MY 2010-2014 Dodge Avenger 200, MY 2010-2014 Dodge Calber, MY 2010-2014 Chrysler Sebring, MY 2013-2015 Ram Tradesman, MY 2012 Ram Van, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Grand Caravan, MY 2010-2016 Chrysler Town and Country, MY 2010-2017 Jeep Compass, MY 2011-2020 Dodge Durango, MY 2011-2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Journey, MY 2010-2012 Jeep Liberty, MY 2010-2011 Jeep Nitro, and MY 2010-2011 Jeep Patriot vehicles.On December 2, 2019, ODI received a response from FCA that included vehicle production data, consumer complaints, field reports, warranty claims, manufacturer actions, production changes, and other data related to the alleged defect from the start of production (2010) through September 24, 2019.On January 27, 2020, ODI received an update to the December 2, 2019, IR response from FCA.On September 22, 2020, ODI requested additional subject vehicle AHR information from FCA.ODI received FCA's response on October 21, 2020.ODI subsequently received an update to FCA's October 21, 2020, response on February 16, 2021.During the investigation, ODI requested updates to certain IR questions on two occasions.FCA provided updates to question #2 on March 5, 2021, and questions #2 and #5 on May 26, 2023. FCA’s IR response data identified approximately 7.5 million subject vehicles (with approximately 15 million AHR assemblies).Due to the large number of vehicles and failure reports, ODI focused its analysis on the FCA vehicle model with the highest failure rate to represent the worst-case scenario.For this purpose, ODI focused on MY 2012-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles for its analysis.This population includes 710,890 vehicles that FCA manufactured between August 19, 2011, and August 8, 2015.ODI identified 2,839 alleged AHR failures within this limited population.ODI identified 263 alleged injuries that were caused by AHR failures in MY 2012-2015 Grand Cherokees vehicles.Of these alleged injuries, ODI categorized them as eighty-two (82) soft tissue (neck/whiplash, bruise) injuries, four (4) concussions, fifty-nine (59) headaches, and one hundred eighteen (118) without a specific injury description.Although complainants have alleged injuries, ODI has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate or validate any injuries where medical treatment was required.Consumer outreach was conducted by ODI, where sixty-three (63) FCA complainants with alleged injuries were contacted.Twelve of the sixty-three FCA consumers responded and were interviewed by ODI.ODI requested medical records, however, only one response was provided. Attorneys representing the responding complainant provided a synopsis that indicated they had experienced prior neck-related injuries dating to the mid-1990s.ODI also contacted one hundred (100) consumers who submitted Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) in an attempt to validate alleged injuries. Despite the efforts of ODI, the office has been unsuccessful at obtaining substantive documentation/evidence supporting complaints that allege serious injuries (where pre-existing medical conditions did not already exist). In addition to the low severity of alleged injuries caused by AHR deployments, there have been eleven alleged crashes and two alleged lane departures within the entire subject vehicle population that has been in the field up to sixteen years (with over 8,500 AHR inadvertent deployments).ODI was not able to validate that the alleged crashes were the result of inadvertent head rest deployments, and the crashes were minor in nature. ODI has conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged safety defect and with up to sixteen years of exposure for some vehicles and over 8,500 inadvertent AHR deployments, no serious crashes or injuries could be validated in the sub-population of focus.The lack of serious injuries validated by ODI with such large period of field exposure is consistent with thework done by NHTSA’s Human Injury Research Division and the Biodynamic Research Corporation, which support that an inadvertent AHR deployment is not likely to cause serious injury.In addition to the low risk of injury, FCA released an extended warranty program that covers inadvertent AHR deployment for ten years / unlimited mileage from the vehicle's in-service date. PE19014 is closed with the FCA extended warranty program.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances. To review a complete closing summary, please the attached closing report. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Seats:front Assembly:head Restraint
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE19014 on September 9, 2019, to investigate 128 consumer complaints alleging that the Active Head Rest (AHR) inadvertently deployed without the occurrence of a crash or other rear impact event in model year (MY) 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles.When ODI opened the investigation, ODI was aware of thirteen alleged injuries.A small number of Early Warning Reports identified driver and/or passenger front seat AHR inadvertent deployments without a rear impact event.Reported safety consequences resulting from the AHR deployments include concussions, headaches, soft tissue injuries, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and/or loss of vehicle control as a result of being surprised and distracted by being struck in the head by the inadvertent AHR deployment. On September 24, 2019, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA).ODI requested certain detailed information from FCA related to the following subject vehicles: MY 2010-2014 Dodge Avenger 200, MY 2010-2014 Dodge Calber, MY 2010-2014 Chrysler Sebring, MY 2013-2015 Ram Tradesman, MY 2012 Ram Van, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Grand Caravan, MY 2010-2016 Chrysler Town and Country, MY 2010-2017 Jeep Compass, MY 2011-2020 Dodge Durango, MY 2011-2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Journey, MY 2010-2012 Jeep Liberty, MY 2010-2011 Jeep Nitro, and MY 2010-2011 Jeep Patriot vehicles.On December 2, 2019, ODI received a response from FCA that included vehicle production data, consumer complaints, field reports, warranty claims, manufacturer actions, production changes, and other data related to the alleged defect from the start of production (2010) through September 24, 2019.On January 27, 2020, ODI received an update to the December 2, 2019, IR response from FCA.On September 22, 2020, ODI requested additional subject vehicle AHR information from FCA.ODI received FCA's response on October 21, 2020.ODI subsequently received an update to FCA's October 21, 2020, response on February 16, 2021.During the investigation, ODI requested updates to certain IR questions on two occasions.FCA provided updates to question #2 on March 5, 2021, and questions #2 and #5 on May 26, 2023. FCA’s IR response data identified approximately 7.5 million subject vehicles (with approximately 15 million AHR assemblies).Due to the large number of vehicles and failure reports, ODI focused its analysis on the FCA vehicle model with the highest failure rate to represent the worst-case scenario.For this purpose, ODI focused on MY 2012-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles for its analysis.This population includes 710,890 vehicles that FCA manufactured between August 19, 2011, and August 8, 2015.ODI identified 2,839 alleged AHR failures within this limited population.ODI identified 263 alleged injuries that were caused by AHR failures in MY 2012-2015 Grand Cherokees vehicles.Of these alleged injuries, ODI categorized them as eighty-two (82) soft tissue (neck/whiplash, bruise) injuries, four (4) concussions, fifty-nine (59) headaches, and one hundred eighteen (118) without a specific injury description.Although complainants have alleged injuries, ODI has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate or validate any injuries where medical treatment was required.Consumer outreach was conducted by ODI, where sixty-three (63) FCA complainants with alleged injuries were contacted.Twelve of the sixty-three FCA consumers responded and were interviewed by ODI.ODI requested medical records, however, only one response was provided. Attorneys representing the responding complainant provided a synopsis that indicated they had experienced prior neck-related injuries dating to the mid-1990s.ODI also contacted one hundred (100) consumers who submitted Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) in an attempt to validate alleged injuries. Despite the efforts of ODI, the office has been unsuccessful at obtaining substantive documentation/evidence supporting complaints that allege serious injuries (where pre-existing medical conditions did not already exist). In addition to the low severity of alleged injuries caused by AHR deployments, there have been eleven alleged crashes and two alleged lane departures within the entire subject vehicle population that has been in the field up to sixteen years (with over 8,500 AHR inadvertent deployments).ODI was not able to validate that the alleged crashes were the result of inadvertent head rest deployments, and the crashes were minor in nature. ODI has conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged safety defect and with up to sixteen years of exposure for some vehicles and over 8,500 inadvertent AHR deployments, no serious crashes or injuries could be validated in the sub-population of focus.The lack of serious injuries validated by ODI with such large period of field exposure is consistent with thework done by NHTSA’s Human Injury Research Division and the Biodynamic Research Corporation, which support that an inadvertent AHR deployment is not likely to cause serious injury.In addition to the low risk of injury, FCA released an extended warranty program that covers inadvertent AHR deployment for ten years / unlimited mileage from the vehicle's in-service date. PE19014 is closed with the FCA extended warranty program.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances. To review a complete closing summary, please the attached closing report. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
EA19001 · Electrical Overstress
Opened Apr 19, 2019 · Closed Sep 19, 2024
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags: Air Bag/restraint Control Module
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW. The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications. The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU. In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle. Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time. In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners. Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.
PE17003 · Occupant Restraint Controller Failure
Opened Jun 1, 2017 · Closed Dec 25, 2017
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Air Bags; Air Bags:frontal; Air Bags:frontal:sensor/control MODULE-INACTIVE
The Office of Defects Investigation opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate VOQ complaints alleging a failure of the Occupant Restraint Controller (ORC) module in model year (MY) 2012 Jeep Liberty.The purpose of the investigation was to understand Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) complaints stating that the air bag warning light remained illuminated while the vehicle was in operation.In many cases the warning light issue was reportedly corrected by a replacement of the ORC module. In 2013 FCA issued NHTSA safety recall 13V282 to address ORC module failures caused by an electrical over stress (EOS) condition that damaged an internal resistor.The failure lead to non-deployment of the active head restraints in rear impact crashes of sufficient severity to require deployment.This condition would also result in illumination of the air bag warning light and set a B2208 diagnostic trouble code (DTC).Recall 13V282 involved two different remedies based on the model year and model of the recalled vehicle.Some models were repaired by replacing the ORC with an updated unit.However the subject vehicles of this investigation, which made up the largest population in the recall, received a software update to the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM), another electronic device that is involved in powering of the ORC. After the investigation was opened, FCA began collecting failed subject vehicle ORC modules so they could be analyzed for failure causation.From June 2017 to August 2017 FCA obtained 13 ORC modules and analyzed 10 of them.FCA determined 9 contained evidence of the resistor over stress condition.Of that group, 7 had experienced resistor failures prior to the TIPM being re-flashed under the recall action.In these cases, replacement of the ORC module would have been the only effective repair to extinguish the air bag warning lamp.This observation correlates well with VOQ complaints ODI received from consumers who experienced an airbag warning light illuminated when they presented their vehicle in for the original 13V282 repair.Many of these consumers were told the TIPM re-flash did not fix the warning light issue, and that their ORC module needed to be replaced (at the consumer's expense). ODI notes that 8 of the 10 analyzed ORCs displaying the resistor EOS condition also had DTC B1BCF stored.This code is related to the detection of a possible internal fault with a rollover sensor.FCA conducted additional testing and concluded that the presence of the resistor failure caused the subsequent setting of the this DTC. On October 4, 2017 FCA decided to conduct a safety recall to replace the subject vehicle ORC modules with a redesigned device.FCA submitted the defect information report to the agency on October 10, 2017. See NHTSA 17V640 for further details.Accordingly the investigation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ID numbers: 10994134, 10994095, 10993838, 10993675, 10993482, 10991764, 10985011, 10984531, 10980350, 10970003, 10969021, 10957076, 10948802, 10945162, 10938664, 10928226, 10917300, 10904332, 10896571, 10893915, 10888324, 10887727, 10865180, 10862586, 10860359, 10853737, 10850921, 10850366, 10837723, 10837086, 10816784, 10816174, 10810454, 10787829, 10778572, 10766688, 10761468, 10761189, 10747749, 10746608, 10744774, 10736037, 10730658, 10717657, 10706097, 10684125, 10681813, 10652841, 10648367, 10641248, 10622487, 10619379, 10618765, 10617657, 10614874, 10608301, 10605955, 11041327, 11047850, 11030130, 11012891, 11024995, 11051267, 11012170
Additional source detail variants (3)
Air Bags
The Office of Defects Investigation opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate VOQ complaints alleging a failure of the Occupant Restraint Controller (ORC) module in model year (MY) 2012 Jeep Liberty.The purpose of the investigation was to understand Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) complaints stating that the air bag warning light remained illuminated while the vehicle was in operation.In many cases the warning light issue was reportedly corrected by a replacement of the ORC module. In 2013 FCA issued NHTSA safety recall 13V282 to address ORC module failures caused by an electrical over stress (EOS) condition that damaged an internal resistor.The failure lead to non-deployment of the active head restraints in rear impact crashes of sufficient severity to require deployment.This condition would also result in illumination of the air bag warning light and set a B2208 diagnostic trouble code (DTC).Recall 13V282 involved two different remedies based on the model year and model of the recalled vehicle.Some models were repaired by replacing the ORC with an updated unit.However the subject vehicles of this investigation, which made up the largest population in the recall, received a software update to the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM), another electronic device that is involved in powering of the ORC. After the investigation was opened, FCA began collecting failed subject vehicle ORC modules so they could be analyzed for failure causation.From June 2017 to August 2017 FCA obtained 13 ORC modules and analyzed 10 of them.FCA determined 9 contained evidence of the resistor over stress condition.Of that group, 7 had experienced resistor failures prior to the TIPM being re-flashed under the recall action.In these cases, replacement of the ORC module would have been the only effective repair to extinguish the air bag warning lamp.This observation correlates well with VOQ complaints ODI received from consumers who experienced an airbag warning light illuminated when they presented their vehicle in for the original 13V282 repair.Many of these consumers were told the TIPM re-flash did not fix the warning light issue, and that their ORC module needed to be replaced (at the consumer's expense). ODI notes that 8 of the 10 analyzed ORCs displaying the resistor EOS condition also had DTC B1BCF stored.This code is related to the detection of a possible internal fault with a rollover sensor.FCA conducted additional testing and concluded that the presence of the resistor failure caused the subsequent setting of the this DTC. On October 4, 2017 FCA decided to conduct a safety recall to replace the subject vehicle ORC modules with a redesigned device.FCA submitted the defect information report to the agency on October 10, 2017. See NHTSA 17V640 for further details.Accordingly the investigation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ID numbers: 10994134, 10994095, 10993838, 10993675, 10993482, 10991764, 10985011, 10984531, 10980350, 10970003, 10969021, 10957076, 10948802, 10945162, 10938664, 10928226, 10917300, 10904332, 10896571, 10893915, 10888324, 10887727, 10865180, 10862586, 10860359, 10853737, 10850921, 10850366, 10837723, 10837086, 10816784, 10816174, 10810454, 10787829, 10778572, 10766688, 10761468, 10761189, 10747749, 10746608, 10744774, 10736037, 10730658, 10717657, 10706097, 10684125, 10681813, 10652841, 10648367, 10641248, 10622487, 10619379, 10618765, 10617657, 10614874, 10608301, 10605955, 11041327, 11047850, 11030130, 11012891, 11024995, 11051267, 11012170
Air Bags:frontal
The Office of Defects Investigation opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate VOQ complaints alleging a failure of the Occupant Restraint Controller (ORC) module in model year (MY) 2012 Jeep Liberty.The purpose of the investigation was to understand Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) complaints stating that the air bag warning light remained illuminated while the vehicle was in operation.In many cases the warning light issue was reportedly corrected by a replacement of the ORC module. In 2013 FCA issued NHTSA safety recall 13V282 to address ORC module failures caused by an electrical over stress (EOS) condition that damaged an internal resistor.The failure lead to non-deployment of the active head restraints in rear impact crashes of sufficient severity to require deployment.This condition would also result in illumination of the air bag warning light and set a B2208 diagnostic trouble code (DTC).Recall 13V282 involved two different remedies based on the model year and model of the recalled vehicle.Some models were repaired by replacing the ORC with an updated unit.However the subject vehicles of this investigation, which made up the largest population in the recall, received a software update to the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM), another electronic device that is involved in powering of the ORC. After the investigation was opened, FCA began collecting failed subject vehicle ORC modules so they could be analyzed for failure causation.From June 2017 to August 2017 FCA obtained 13 ORC modules and analyzed 10 of them.FCA determined 9 contained evidence of the resistor over stress condition.Of that group, 7 had experienced resistor failures prior to the TIPM being re-flashed under the recall action.In these cases, replacement of the ORC module would have been the only effective repair to extinguish the air bag warning lamp.This observation correlates well with VOQ complaints ODI received from consumers who experienced an airbag warning light illuminated when they presented their vehicle in for the original 13V282 repair.Many of these consumers were told the TIPM re-flash did not fix the warning light issue, and that their ORC module needed to be replaced (at the consumer's expense). ODI notes that 8 of the 10 analyzed ORCs displaying the resistor EOS condition also had DTC B1BCF stored.This code is related to the detection of a possible internal fault with a rollover sensor.FCA conducted additional testing and concluded that the presence of the resistor failure caused the subsequent setting of the this DTC. On October 4, 2017 FCA decided to conduct a safety recall to replace the subject vehicle ORC modules with a redesigned device.FCA submitted the defect information report to the agency on October 10, 2017. See NHTSA 17V640 for further details.Accordingly the investigation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ID numbers: 10994134, 10994095, 10993838, 10993675, 10993482, 10991764, 10985011, 10984531, 10980350, 10970003, 10969021, 10957076, 10948802, 10945162, 10938664, 10928226, 10917300, 10904332, 10896571, 10893915, 10888324, 10887727, 10865180, 10862586, 10860359, 10853737, 10850921, 10850366, 10837723, 10837086, 10816784, 10816174, 10810454, 10787829, 10778572, 10766688, 10761468, 10761189, 10747749, 10746608, 10744774, 10736037, 10730658, 10717657, 10706097, 10684125, 10681813, 10652841, 10648367, 10641248, 10622487, 10619379, 10618765, 10617657, 10614874, 10608301, 10605955, 11041327, 11047850, 11030130, 11012891, 11024995, 11051267, 11012170
Air Bags:frontal:sensor/control MODULE-INACTIVE
The Office of Defects Investigation opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate VOQ complaints alleging a failure of the Occupant Restraint Controller (ORC) module in model year (MY) 2012 Jeep Liberty.The purpose of the investigation was to understand Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) complaints stating that the air bag warning light remained illuminated while the vehicle was in operation.In many cases the warning light issue was reportedly corrected by a replacement of the ORC module. In 2013 FCA issued NHTSA safety recall 13V282 to address ORC module failures caused by an electrical over stress (EOS) condition that damaged an internal resistor.The failure lead to non-deployment of the active head restraints in rear impact crashes of sufficient severity to require deployment.This condition would also result in illumination of the air bag warning light and set a B2208 diagnostic trouble code (DTC).Recall 13V282 involved two different remedies based on the model year and model of the recalled vehicle.Some models were repaired by replacing the ORC with an updated unit.However the subject vehicles of this investigation, which made up the largest population in the recall, received a software update to the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM), another electronic device that is involved in powering of the ORC. After the investigation was opened, FCA began collecting failed subject vehicle ORC modules so they could be analyzed for failure causation.From June 2017 to August 2017 FCA obtained 13 ORC modules and analyzed 10 of them.FCA determined 9 contained evidence of the resistor over stress condition.Of that group, 7 had experienced resistor failures prior to the TIPM being re-flashed under the recall action.In these cases, replacement of the ORC module would have been the only effective repair to extinguish the air bag warning lamp.This observation correlates well with VOQ complaints ODI received from consumers who experienced an airbag warning light illuminated when they presented their vehicle in for the original 13V282 repair.Many of these consumers were told the TIPM re-flash did not fix the warning light issue, and that their ORC module needed to be replaced (at the consumer's expense). ODI notes that 8 of the 10 analyzed ORCs displaying the resistor EOS condition also had DTC B1BCF stored.This code is related to the detection of a possible internal fault with a rollover sensor.FCA conducted additional testing and concluded that the presence of the resistor failure caused the subsequent setting of the this DTC. On October 4, 2017 FCA decided to conduct a safety recall to replace the subject vehicle ORC modules with a redesigned device.FCA submitted the defect information report to the agency on October 10, 2017. See NHTSA 17V640 for further details.Accordingly the investigation is closed.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ID numbers: 10994134, 10994095, 10993838, 10993675, 10993482, 10991764, 10985011, 10984531, 10980350, 10970003, 10969021, 10957076, 10948802, 10945162, 10938664, 10928226, 10917300, 10904332, 10896571, 10893915, 10888324, 10887727, 10865180, 10862586, 10860359, 10853737, 10850921, 10850366, 10837723, 10837086, 10816784, 10816174, 10810454, 10787829, 10778572, 10766688, 10761468, 10761189, 10747749, 10746608, 10744774, 10736037, 10730658, 10717657, 10706097, 10684125, 10681813, 10652841, 10648367, 10641248, 10622487, 10619379, 10618765, 10617657, 10614874, 10608301, 10605955, 11041327, 11047850, 11030130, 11012891, 11024995, 11051267, 11012170
DP14004 · Totally Integrated Power Module Failure
Opened Sep 25, 2014 · Closed Jul 24, 2015
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System
In a letter dated August 21, 2014, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a defect investigation of alleged failures associated with the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV?s, trucks, and vans beginning in the 2007 model year. The petitioner alleges that TIPM defects may result in engine stall, airbag non-deployment, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended acceleration, fire, and other symptoms. On September 25, 2014, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP14-004 to evaluate the petition for a grant or deny decision. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by CAS as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers. In total, there were 296 complaints submitted by the petitioner in the original petition and five supplements, including 271 complaints related to the subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. Approximately 3 percent of CAS complaints are related to vehicles equipped with TIPM-6 and ODI?s review of these complaints did not identify any safety defect trends. ODI conducted a detailed review of complaints narratives submitted by CAS and consumers including careful analysis of vehicle repair histories, warranty claims obtained from the manufacturer and any available Customer Assistance Inquiry reports (CAIR). Analysis of the field data indicated that MY2011-2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles exhibited significantly higher complaint rates related to fuel pump relay (FPR) failures than other subject vehicles. In a September 3, 2014 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect Information Report (DIR) identifying a defect in the FPR within the TIPM-7 which can result in a no start or stall condition in approximately 188,723 model year (MY) 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee (WK) and Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles manufactured from January 5, 2010 through July 20, 2011 (14V-530).In a February 24, 2015 letter, Chrysler submitted a second DIR expanding the scope of the FPR defect condition to include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 through 2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from September 17, 2010 through August 19, 2013 and MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango vehicles manufactured from January 18, 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V-115).ODI analysis of the CAS allegations of TIPM defects resulting in stall while driving, airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration, fire and other faults identified a single defect condition related to 1 of over 60 different circuits in the TIPM assembly. The most common effect of this defect condition, related to the fuel pump relay, was a no-start concern, but it could also result in stall while driving (76 complaints). No valid evidence was presented in support of claims related to airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire resulting from TIPM faults and these claims were found to be wholly without merit based on review of the field data and design of the relevant systems and components.Except insofar as the petitioner's contentions relate to the defect condition addressed by the Chrysler recalls, the factual bases of the petitioner's contentions that any further investigation is necessary are unsupported. In our view, additional investigation is unlikely to result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the requested investigation. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety mission, the petition is den
PE13034 · Jeep Liberty Door Fires
Opened Oct 21, 2013 · Closed Mar 9, 2014
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System; Visibility:power Window Devices And Controls
The driver's side power master window switch (PMWS) evaluted during this investigation controls the power windows for all four doors, the power mirrors and door locks.The PMWS is located on the driver's side door panel.Chrysler advised that the PMWS was used on multiple vehicle platforms including model year (MY) 2011 Dodge Nitro, MY 2011-2012 Jeep Liberty and MY 2011 Chrysler Town & Country and Dodge Caravan for a total of approximately 425,000 vehicles.At the opening of the investigation, ODI identified two reports of fire near the vicinity of the PMWS on MY 2012 Jeep Liberty Vehicles.During the course of the investigation, ODI determined that one of the complaint fires was not likely caused by a PMWS failure as available evidence indicated the fire started in the dashboard as opposed to the door panel area.Accordingly, the report was removed from the above counts.In response to ODI's October 30, 2013 information request (IR) letter, Chrysler advised that it was only aware of the same two fire reports as ODI and that it had concluded one of the reports did not involve a PMWS failure.ODI has not identified any new subject vehicle reports involving PMWS fires during the course of the investigation.In addition to the reports alleging fire, ODI evaluated other reports and data related to PMWS failures including consumer complaints, field reports, law suits, and warranty claims provided by Chrysler in its response.ODI interviewed owners of complaint vehicles when additional information was required.In addition to the subject Jeep Liberty, ODI reports for the additional Chrysler vehicles that use the same PMWS were also reviewed.ODI identified two additional ODI complaints (see ODI 10523317 and 10474901) involving Chrysler minivans that alleged door fires that were, or may have been related to a PMWS failure.In discussions with ODI, Chrysler stated that it conducted a search for consumer complaints alleging PMWS related door fires on the additional vehicles that use the same PMWS but did not identify any responsive reports.Based on ODI's assessment of available data, the overall failure rate for the PMWS, which was used in a large population of vehicles, appears to be low, and the failure rate for those that resulted in fires is even lower.Additionally the data does not indicate a trend, climatic, or regional effects indicative of an actionable defect issue.A safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time and further use of agency resources does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, the investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist.The agency will monitor the issue and reserves the right to take future action if warranted by the circumstances.The ODI report cited above can be reviewed online at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10459029
Additional source detail variants (2)
Electrical System
The driver's side power master window switch (PMWS) evaluted during this investigation controls the power windows for all four doors, the power mirrors and door locks.The PMWS is located on the driver's side door panel.Chrysler advised that the PMWS was used on multiple vehicle platforms including model year (MY) 2011 Dodge Nitro, MY 2011-2012 Jeep Liberty and MY 2011 Chrysler Town & Country and Dodge Caravan for a total of approximately 425,000 vehicles.At the opening of the investigation, ODI identified two reports of fire near the vicinity of the PMWS on MY 2012 Jeep Liberty Vehicles.During the course of the investigation, ODI determined that one of the complaint fires was not likely caused by a PMWS failure as available evidence indicated the fire started in the dashboard as opposed to the door panel area.Accordingly, the report was removed from the above counts.In response to ODI's October 30, 2013 information request (IR) letter, Chrysler advised that it was only aware of the same two fire reports as ODI and that it had concluded one of the reports did not involve a PMWS failure.ODI has not identified any new subject vehicle reports involving PMWS fires during the course of the investigation.In addition to the reports alleging fire, ODI evaluated other reports and data related to PMWS failures including consumer complaints, field reports, law suits, and warranty claims provided by Chrysler in its response.ODI interviewed owners of complaint vehicles when additional information was required.In addition to the subject Jeep Liberty, ODI reports for the additional Chrysler vehicles that use the same PMWS were also reviewed.ODI identified two additional ODI complaints (see ODI 10523317 and 10474901) involving Chrysler minivans that alleged door fires that were, or may have been related to a PMWS failure.In discussions with ODI, Chrysler stated that it conducted a search for consumer complaints alleging PMWS related door fires on the additional vehicles that use the same PMWS but did not identify any responsive reports.Based on ODI's assessment of available data, the overall failure rate for the PMWS, which was used in a large population of vehicles, appears to be low, and the failure rate for those that resulted in fires is even lower.Additionally the data does not indicate a trend, climatic, or regional effects indicative of an actionable defect issue.A safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time and further use of agency resources does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, the investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist.The agency will monitor the issue and reserves the right to take future action if warranted by the circumstances.The ODI report cited above can be reviewed online at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10459029
Visibility:power Window Devices And Controls
The driver's side power master window switch (PMWS) evaluted during this investigation controls the power windows for all four doors, the power mirrors and door locks.The PMWS is located on the driver's side door panel.Chrysler advised that the PMWS was used on multiple vehicle platforms including model year (MY) 2011 Dodge Nitro, MY 2011-2012 Jeep Liberty and MY 2011 Chrysler Town & Country and Dodge Caravan for a total of approximately 425,000 vehicles.At the opening of the investigation, ODI identified two reports of fire near the vicinity of the PMWS on MY 2012 Jeep Liberty Vehicles.During the course of the investigation, ODI determined that one of the complaint fires was not likely caused by a PMWS failure as available evidence indicated the fire started in the dashboard as opposed to the door panel area.Accordingly, the report was removed from the above counts.In response to ODI's October 30, 2013 information request (IR) letter, Chrysler advised that it was only aware of the same two fire reports as ODI and that it had concluded one of the reports did not involve a PMWS failure.ODI has not identified any new subject vehicle reports involving PMWS fires during the course of the investigation.In addition to the reports alleging fire, ODI evaluated other reports and data related to PMWS failures including consumer complaints, field reports, law suits, and warranty claims provided by Chrysler in its response.ODI interviewed owners of complaint vehicles when additional information was required.In addition to the subject Jeep Liberty, ODI reports for the additional Chrysler vehicles that use the same PMWS were also reviewed.ODI identified two additional ODI complaints (see ODI 10523317 and 10474901) involving Chrysler minivans that alleged door fires that were, or may have been related to a PMWS failure.In discussions with ODI, Chrysler stated that it conducted a search for consumer complaints alleging PMWS related door fires on the additional vehicles that use the same PMWS but did not identify any responsive reports.Based on ODI's assessment of available data, the overall failure rate for the PMWS, which was used in a large population of vehicles, appears to be low, and the failure rate for those that resulted in fires is even lower.Additionally the data does not indicate a trend, climatic, or regional effects indicative of an actionable defect issue.A safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time and further use of agency resources does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, the investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist.The agency will monitor the issue and reserves the right to take future action if warranted by the circumstances.The ODI report cited above can be reviewed online at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchNHTSAID under the following identification numbers: 10459029
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