NHTSA owner reports · September 18, 2026 snapshot.
Unknown Or Other complaints
23 reportsClear category filterMileage unknown · Mar 17, 2026
Forward Collision AvoidanceLane DepartureUnknown Or Other
I am filing a safety complaint regarding Tesla's removal of driver-controlled maximum speed in FSD (Supervised), a change that has alarmed a significant number of Tesla owners and safety-conscious drivers. Previous software allowed drivers to set a precise maximum speed via the steering wheel scroll wheel while FSD (Supervised)…
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I am filing a safety complaint regarding Tesla's removal of driver-controlled maximum speed in FSD (Supervised), a change that has alarmed a significant number of Tesla owners and safety-conscious drivers. Previous software allowed drivers to set a precise maximum speed via the steering wheel scroll wheel while FSD (Supervised) was active. Tesla replaced this with fixed "Speed Profiles" (Sloth, Chill, Standard, Hurry, Mad Max), none of which allow a driver to set a specific speed. Each profile operates at a programmed range relative to the posted speed limit. Even the slowest profile (Sloth) has been observed exceeding the speed limit. The system also frequently misreads posted limits entirely. This is a serious safety regression. In winter conditions, a cautious driver may need to travel well below the speed limit due to snow or black ice. Previously, they could reduce FSD's max speed precisely. That is no longer possible, the system determines speed, and the driver cannot override it downward while FSD remains engaged. This concern is not isolated to just me. Online forums and Tesla owner communities have seen widespread discussion and frustration over this change, with many drivers expressing that it has made them feel unsafe and less in control of their own vehicle. Removing precise speed control from a supervised autonomous system directly contradicts Tesla's stated position that the driver remains responsible for safe operation. This is an ongoing issue and not limited to a single date for the "Tell us the approximate date this incident occurred." I request NHTSA: 1. Investigate Tesla's removal of driver-adjustable maximum speed in FSD (Supervised); 2. Evaluate compliance with FMVSS and driver control guidelines for automated driving features; 3. Require Tesla to restore precise, driver-controlled maximum speed settings.
NHTSA ODI #11724851
Mileage unknown · Feb 12, 2026
Electrical SystemUnknown Or Other
Vehicle Information 2025 Tesla Model Y Approx. 30,000 miles Purchased new ~11 months ago Incident Description While driving at highway speed, the front trunk (frunk/hood) of my 2025 Tesla Model Y unexpectedly opened. The hood immediately flew upward, flipped backward over the windshield, and shattered the windshield. The fr…
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Vehicle Information 2025 Tesla Model Y Approx. 30,000 miles Purchased new ~11 months ago Incident Description While driving at highway speed, the front trunk (frunk/hood) of my 2025 Tesla Model Y unexpectedly opened. The hood immediately flew upward, flipped backward over the windshield, and shattered the windshield. The frunk had not been opened in approximately two weeks prior to the incident. The vehicle had not undergone recent service or repair involving the hood or latch assembly. There were no prior warnings or alerts indicating that the frunk was unlatched or not latched properly before driving. The hood appeared fully closed prior to the trip. However, after the incident once we pulled over, a bolt was completely out of place, as shown in my video. Even if the primary latch was faulty, the secondary latch / catch should have prevented the hood from opening all the way and slamming the windshield. This failure to notify improper latching created an immediate and total obstruction of forward visibility at highway speed and posed a serious crash risk. The vehicle has approximately 30,000 miles and is less than one year old. Given Tesla’s prior recall related to hood latch detection issues, I am concerned that either: •The latch system failed mechanically, and/or •The vehicle failed to properly detect and warn of an unlatched hood. This is a significant safety event and could result in serious injury or death if it occurs in traffic.
NHTSA ODI #11717446
Mileage unknown · Jan 26, 2026
Forward Collision AvoidanceUnknown Or OtherCrash
On January 17, 2026 the vehicle self-accelerated when put in reverse and crashed into a parked truck. This was the second time this occurred. The prior incident occurred on November 29, 2025 when backing out of the garage at our home. The new incident occurred the FIRST time we put the car in reverse after receiving it back afte…
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On January 17, 2026 the vehicle self-accelerated when put in reverse and crashed into a parked truck. This was the second time this occurred. The prior incident occurred on November 29, 2025 when backing out of the garage at our home. The new incident occurred the FIRST time we put the car in reverse after receiving it back after repair from the prior accident (we received it on January 15. 2026 and this was the first time we drove it since then). We had driven the car forward with the full self driving feature turned on and engaged (part of the time and part manually) without incident. However when placed in reverse with the full delf driving turned on but not enagaged the car "took off." It is only through good fortune no one was seriously injured or killed. Self acceleration in reverse only occurred after the vehicle was serviced by Tesla to repair the full self driving system which, at that time, would only engage intermittently.
NHTSA ODI #11713398
Mileage unknown · Dec 28, 2025
StructureUnknown Or OtherVisibility/wiper
Date: December 28, 2025 Time: Approximately 3:25 PM Vehicle: 2026 Tesla Model Y Incident Location: Southbound on the I-35N feeder road, just north of Highway 114. Safe Harbor Location: Burger King (15925 N Hwy 114, Northlake, TX) Statement of Facts: I was driving my 2026 Tesla Model Y southbound on the I-35N feeder road at appro…
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Date: December 28, 2025 Time: Approximately 3:25 PM Vehicle: 2026 Tesla Model Y Incident Location: Southbound on the I-35N feeder road, just north of Highway 114. Safe Harbor Location: Burger King (15925 N Hwy 114, Northlake, TX) Statement of Facts: I was driving my 2026 Tesla Model Y southbound on the I-35N feeder road at approximately 3:25 PM today. I was traveling at a steady speed of 55 MPH. Without any warning chime or dashboard notification, the front hood (frunk) suddenly and violently flew open. The hood slammed into the windshield, shattering the glass across my entire field of vision and completely obstructing the road ahead. I was forced to perform an emergency "blind" stop on the feeder road. Once the vehicle was under control, I drove at approximately 10 MPH with zero forward visibility to reach a safe location off the main road. I pulled into the Burger King parking lot located at the intersection of I-35 and Highway 114 to inspect the damage and call for assistance. Key Safety Failures: • Software Failure: At no point before the hood flew open did the vehicle alert me that the frunk was unlatched. • Mechanical Failure: The latching mechanism failed to hold at standard highway speeds, creating a life-threatening visibility hazard. • Structural Damage: The windshield is fully shattered, and the hood and hinges are visibly warped from the force of the impact. Conclusion: This incident was a catastrophic safety failure. Given Tesla's history of recalls for this exact issue (NHTSA Recall 24V-554), it is clear that this 2026 model either suffers from the same defect or the previous "software fix" is insufficient to protect drivers.
NHTSA ODI #11707389
Mileage unknown · Dec 17, 2025
Unknown Or Other
On December 16 and 17, 2025, the manufacturer (Tesla, Inc.) utilized remote telemetry to modify the software state of my 2025 Model Y while it was being operated on public roadways. The manufacturer remotely switched the vehicle profile to "Inventory Mode" (Error Code displayed: "Delivery Type: PICKUP_SERVICE_CENTER"). The Safe…
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On December 16 and 17, 2025, the manufacturer (Tesla, Inc.) utilized remote telemetry to modify the software state of my 2025 Model Y while it was being operated on public roadways. The manufacturer remotely switched the vehicle profile to "Inventory Mode" (Error Code displayed: "Delivery Type: PICKUP_SERVICE_CENTER"). The Safety Failure: This unauthorized remote manipulation immediately DISABLED the electronic Child Safety Locks without driver consent or warning. My minor children were seated in the rear of the vehicle at the time. The rear doors, which had been locked for child safety, suddenly became operable from the inside while the vehicle was in motion - and my children actually opened the doors while the vehicle was in operation. (Thus my discovery of the issue) The Hazard: This defect allows the manufacturer to remotely override and deactivate critical safety retention features (Child Locks) on a moving vehicle. This created an immediate risk of accidental door opening and passenger ejection for the minor occupants. Manufacturer Response: The manufacturer admitted in writing (email dated Dec 15, 2025) that there was "No Active Financing" on the vehicle, yet persisted in accessing the vehicle's safety computer systems to alter its status. This demonstrates a systemic defect where Tesla’s remote access tools lack safety interlocks, allowing them to degrade safety features on vehicles currently in motion/use by consumers. Status: The vehicle remains unsafe as the manufacturer retains the ability to toggle safety locks remotely without operator input.
NHTSA ODI #11705739
Mileage unknown · Dec 15, 2025
Unknown Or Other
After approximately 6 months we leased this vehicle we found out some issues with the vehicle. This vehicle has e Parking(P),Drive(D),Neutral(N),Reverse(R) positions. When you want to maneuver you vehicle you pull the lever at the required position. So what happenes some times: I put the vehicle in drive(D) and when I am in very…
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After approximately 6 months we leased this vehicle we found out some issues with the vehicle. This vehicle has e Parking(P),Drive(D),Neutral(N),Reverse(R) positions. When you want to maneuver you vehicle you pull the lever at the required position. So what happenes some times: I put the vehicle in drive(D) and when I am in very slow traffic,or stop and go traffic or in stop light/sign vehicle Parks itself in Park (P) positions and sometime its difficult placing the vehicle right away in Drive (D). Parking (P) is reseved only to put the vehicle manually in Park(P) like any other vehicle. This vehicle has another option :when you remove your feet from accelarator after 2-4 sec it does apply brakes without pressing the brake pedal. This has happen several times until now. Can you imaging you are in traffick and this keeps happen and when it happens there is a possibility that this can be cause for accident because as soon as trafic start moving drivers behind you as soon as they see that traffic is moving they aslo start moving and if the car does Park istelf than the chance for the driver behind you to hit you is high,because you are making unintentionaly unnecesary sudden stop . I brought this problem up several times to manufacture's service location and they are telling me (initially i was told its normal,after explaing in details thay accepted the issue and took the vehicle and kept for 2 weeks .) After the service i was told that nothing was found .Issue had repeated againg.Also i was told that they are not able to find/read a problem if something happen to the car if had passed more than a month from the incident .I informed them again with the date/time stapm.Looks like they are not taking this issue seriosly, and i beleive that this is a safety issue because this for now its happening when in slow speeds but no one knows that this will not happen in higher speed and if this happen in higher speeds the consequences are bad. Thank you
NHTSA ODI #11705024
Mileage unknown · Oct 23, 2025
Electrical SystemUnknown Or Other
The horn becomes MUTED during rain. Major safety defect. Tesla service center checked and replied 'it works normal when water driesd out'. This is a major safety problem. Technician is telling me that's how it is, does that mean raining days I have to drive without a functional horn? Sunny days it works fine, as that's how e…
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The horn becomes MUTED during rain. Major safety defect. Tesla service center checked and replied 'it works normal when water driesd out'. This is a major safety problem. Technician is telling me that's how it is, does that mean raining days I have to drive without a functional horn? Sunny days it works fine, as that's how every vehicle should be. But under slippery, foggy and limited vision raining days, car becomes mute on horn, how would that be fine and normal? The horn is a federally mandated safety feature. A horn that fails in the rain is a safety defect. Tesla need to have attention on this and either fix the issue or replace the horn with other better designed product. I'm not the only model y owner who has this issue, Google it, you'll see that's a 'common problem '
NHTSA ODI #11695159
Mileage unknown · May 27, 2025
Unknown Or OtherCrash
My Model Y reversed twice in a month while in 'D' drive mode. In one incident, I was pulling my car out of the parking lot in a garage and shifted the gear stalk down multiple times to engage 'D' drive mode. Instead of moving forward, the car reversed and collided with the garage wall.
NHTSA ODI #11663073
Mileage unknown · May 22, 2025
Unknown Or Other
I signaled for a slight turn to the right. And then within 100 yards I came to an intersection where the main path , my path, of travel beared left. As I approached this T and was about to bear left, I saw the driver on the leg of the T about to pull directly into my path… because they saw that my right turn signal was still o…
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I signaled for a slight turn to the right. And then within 100 yards I came to an intersection where the main path , my path, of travel beared left. As I approached this T and was about to bear left, I saw the driver on the leg of the T about to pull directly into my path… because they saw that my right turn signal was still on about 60 yards after my original partial turn. Fortunately, I slowed and they paused. That was when I realized the reason for the confusion…that my original right turn signal was still on. The indicator shuts off too late. I would say a good bit later than a typical turn signal.
NHTSA ODI #11662643
Mileage unknown · Apr 26, 2025
Unknown Or Other
Critical Safety Defect Report – Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD) Malfunction on [XXX] I am writing to formally report a critical and potentially deadly safety defect involving Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (FSD) system. During a recent road trip with my husband and daughter from Boston, MA to Washington, D.C., I used Tesla's FSD featu…
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Critical Safety Defect Report – Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD) Malfunction on [XXX] I am writing to formally report a critical and potentially deadly safety defect involving Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (FSD) system. During a recent road trip with my husband and daughter from Boston, MA to Washington, D.C., I used Tesla's FSD feature. On our return trip on [XXX] while traveling on [XXX] under FSD control, the system demonstrated erratic and dangerous behavior that nearly caused a fatal accident. As we approached an intersection on [XXX] , I observed that the traffic lights were red. However, the vehicle—still under FSD control—continued traveling at approximately 70 mph without slowing down. Sensing something was wrong, I quickly intervened and manually stopped the car at the intersection, where cross traffic was moving at high speeds in both directions. Had I reacted even a second later—or had the lights remained red in our direction—we likely would have been struck and potentially killed by the oncoming traffic. After reviewing dashcam footage from the incident, I confirmed that the FSD system had not only failed to recognize the red traffic signal but had also directed the car onto the wrong path, leading us into the potential path of oncoming vehicles. This serious failure posed an extreme and unacceptable risk to my family’s lives. Following the incident, my young daughter was deeply traumatized and developed a high fever that night. This experience has left lasting emotional and psychological distress for all of us. I believe this event highlights a severe and urgent defect in Tesla’s FSD system. I respectfully urge the NHTSA to launch an immediate investigation to prevent similar occurrences that could result in injury or loss of life. I am prepared to submit the dashcam footage and relevant vehicle logs to support this report. Please advise on the next steps for providing this evidence. Thank you for your attention INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA ODI #11656974
NHTSA investigations
4EA26002 · Fsd Collisions In Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
Opened Mar 18, 2026 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
PE25012 · Traffic Safety Violations While Full Self Driving ("fsd") Is Engaged
Opened Oct 7, 2025 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
AQ25002 · Compliance With Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
Opened Aug 20, 2025 · No close date supplied
Status: open (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
PE24033 · Actually Smart Summon Sessions Resulting In low-speed Impacts.
Opened Jan 6, 2025 · Closed Apr 3, 2026
Status: closed (inferred from source dates) · Electrical System:adas:autonomous/self Driving
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
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